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theGood
Predicating
L. A. KOSMAN

A

lthough the general intent of Aristotle's argument in Nico-

machean Ethics I, 6, 1096a23-27 is clear, the exact nature of
the claim on which the argument rests is not obvious. Aristotle
writes:
OT
e'Tt 8E'ZL
Ta':aov
y Tac
ot (t yaXpeV rTZ 7L )4yerrxt
'r'C(MO't5 Z0XCYSO
tOV 'o

Os64Xat

o0VOuq,

XOCLEV

TCO)

7QL&)OALapSeat,

xcat eV To

,Q rpLov, xOc eV TC 7tpo6 Tt 'r yp-yL.OV, >XCLEV
CM(p6
T67m) aLaXLro xcdL9repa rotcxao)

7rOaCO)

ZX LpOq, Xw ?V

What does Aristotle mean by the claim that good is said in as many
senses as being, and how are we to understand the explanatory clause
which follows? The usual reading of this passage takes Aristotle to be
making one of two claims, depending upon whether the categories are
viewed as classifying types of entity or types of predicate: (a) items
in all categories have good predicated of them, or (b) good can be
predicated in all the categories of predication. In either case, what
follow are understood as subjects of exemplary predications. Thus
"olov 4oOek xac o voi5" is elliptical for "olov 6oOe6 xoXt4 voiu &yCXO6q
?arLIv,"in which good is (a) predicated of a substance, God and intelligence, or (b) predicated in the first category of some entity, namely
God and intelligence. (I am throughout understanding "God and
intelligence" as a hendiadys). Similarly, "occaiperot" is elliptical for
aperoLMyYOodL
da[v,' in which good is (a) predicated of a quality, or
"oML
(b) predicated in the category of quality of some entity, and so on.
It is such a reading which is found in most translations of the passage
in question. I quote here only two:
Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is
predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of
reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e.
of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and
in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right
locality

and the like), . . 1

I Translation by W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard
McKeon, (New York, 1941).
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Secondly, the term "good" has as many meanings as the word
"is": it is used to describe substances, e.g., divinity and intelligence are good; qualities, e.g. the virtues are good; quantities, e.g.,
the proper amount is good; relatedness, e.g., the useful is good;
time, e.g., the right moment is good; place, e.g., a place to live is
good; and so forth.2
But is this the correct reading of Aristotle's argument? Suppose we
understand Aristotle to be claiming (a) that good can be predicated
of entities in any category. Why then the peculiar choice of examples
in the first category? We also say that men, cabbages, and elephants
are good; why couldn't these serve as well as examples of substances
of which good is predicated? And why should Aristotle have given
examples here, while in the other categories mentioned, he presents
what clearly must be taken as explications: "good is predicated of
qualities, namely the virtues".
If, on the other hand, we take Aristotle to be arguing (b) that good
can be predicated in any category, greater difficulties ensue. "iv rC CL
[C'rL] XeyeaOOCL"is Aristotle's normal expression for predication in the
first category, where that means predication of an element in a thing's
It would follow, then, that "4 Oc xoXL06VOi4 iy(04
't ea'T or ou6Lcx.
eaTLv" is an essential predication - that good is the tL Eart or ouat of
God and intelligence.
Were this so, Aristotle's choice of God and inteHigence would become
explicable. But it is impossible, just for the reasons set forth in this
of anything. One
passage, that good should be the T'l ?iTt or oUacLcx
important and central consequence of the categorical diversity of
3'eVaL oix
being is that there is no entity whose essence it is to be: "'rop
o4aLx o68vVL o6 y&p y'vo4 To 'v." (Posterior Analytics II, 6, 92b13)
Similarly, because good is not a genus, as the discussion in question
is meant to show, it is impossible that it should be the re aTn or ouaLo
of anything. Even if we were to allow the possibility that good might
constitute the essence or part of the essence of an entity, we should
still have difficulty with the passage. For if anything looks like a case
of essential predication, "virtue is good" does, or "the right amount is
good". But in that case, the point is lost, for then these are not predications in other categories at all, but eV 'cd 't.
The implausibility of either reading is made clearer by attention to
the language of the passage. For if Aristotle is presenting what are
2

Translation by Martin Ostwald, Nicomachean Ethics, (New York, 1962).
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the subjects of predications in the various categories, we should expect
to find a different construction. Aristotle's meta-descriptions of
predication usually take the form: predicate in the nominative followed
followed by "xoct&"followed by
by "XiyeaOa" or "xcT-jyopFoZaOoa"
subject in the genitive. We should therefore expect to find not "o70vo
Oe64xot 6Ovo5q. ... Ml &pe'T(. . . TO peTpLOVetc.," but "ot0v xocL&TOVO5OU
x%our-& 4pToV.. . .ara
TO 'pLTpouetc.." It is such a
.o..
Xcl ToV VOV
construction which we find, for example, at Posterior Analytics I, 22,
avOp6cou TO6?VuxOv[Xe'year.]," and at Categories
83 a 28: "otov xovra' o5oi)
xocO'UTOXLaL?vou p.ev )1yETot TO5 Ttv6q c06p6 7nou. "
2, 1 a21: "otov `vOpwrnoq
What the language of the passage appears instead to suggest is that
God and intelligence, the virtues, etc., are meant not to be subjects,
but rather to be predicates. But how are we to understand this? It will
lxj
help to pay closer attention to the claim that good is said "'LaozW4
6vrL,"for the passage will become clearer if we see predication of the
good in strict analogy with predication of being.

The doctrine of the categories is just the claim that TO'O6v7VzCx6yeTaL.In making this claim, Aristotle is not primarily claiming that
being is predicated of many kinds of things, but that many kinds of
being are predicated of entities, or that being is predicated in
many senses, just as many as there are categories. "xA' ocaur 8e
EIvOC )IYETOCL 6UOUtsp 0xLvEL

?eye'at, Tocura)x
cV Tt'LCrTL&

TO

a

Tc

yMp
06acz
u')OCTOC
T14 x-TJyopL0x
e7UeL OUV TxxV XCXTyOpOULEVWOV TAO

VOacO?aLV-t,

(Metaphysics A, 7, 1017a22).
When I say that Socrates is a man, this is to predicate of him a certain
kind or sense of being, being what he is. When I say that he is cultured,
this is to predicate of him another kind or sense of being, being a
certain quality, and similarly, when I say that he is five feet tall, or in
the Lyceum, or has his shoes off, etc.
"Socrates has his shoes off" is an interesting case, for it is not immediately obvious that this is an instance of predicating being. It is clear,
however, that we could rephrase this as "Socrates is barefoot," so
that the respect in which we have a predication of being becomes
apparent. Aristotle makes just this point following the passage I have
quoted:

"ox'O&v y&p

7OLOV,..."

lxcp6pzt 106 IvOpconoq uytcxLvov arlv

UYLEVet, OV8? TO 0CVporOq P&GV

tavQposro4
I TO

?C6TLVT, TeVO2AV TQU &V6pGi7tO

r3O4EL

T

8t xi e7 -'V &v?@ov." (Metaphysics A, 7, 1017 a27) What
O&OW)4
this shows is that it is possible in Greek as in English to predicate
being without explicitly using the verb "JvaL" or "to be." Thus to say
"Socrates is a man" is to predicate being in the category of rL?artC, to

TepaV6,
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say "Socrates is cultured" is to predicate being in the category of 7tOLoV,
and to say "Socrates walks" is equally to predicate being (in the
category of noLetv) even though no explicit use is made of the verb
"to be."
It is equally possible to predicate good of items without any explicit
use of the locution "is good." And this fact lies behind Aristotle's point
in the Ethics. To say of something that it is virtuous or is a virtue is a
way of predicating good, relative to the category of quality. Similarly,
to say that something is at the right time, or is in the right amount,
or is in its proper place, is to ;say it is good relative, respectively, to
time, quantity, and place.
We may now understand the nature of Aristotle's argument in the
Ethics. He begins by claiming that good, like being, is predicated in
many categories, that is, that there are many ways of being good.
He then gives examples of predicates which are (disguised) means of
predicating good in each of the categories. To say of God and intelligence that it is God and intelligence is to predicate ev w-,-, for in doing
so we state what something is. At the same time, however, it is to
predicate good of God and intelligence. For God is the best kind of substance one can be, and thus in stating what God is, one is also predicating good of him. It is not, however, that good is what God is; what
he is is God, but that's a good thing to be. Similarly, when we say
but we also
that Socrates is courageous, we predicate ev tj7Mi,
or
being virtuouis in
predicate good of him. For being courageous
general is a good way to be; courage and virtue in general, that is,
are good qualities. The same analysis applies in each of the other
categories. The instances that Aristotle gives, then, are not the subjects of exemplary predicative statements, but rather the predicates
of such statements. They make clear that the multivocity of "good"
is exhibited not only in the fact that many sorts of things may be
said to be good, but more in the fact that predicates of radically
different type are in fact disguised means of predicating the good in
radically different senses.
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